Start Equity and welfarism accommodating political commit

Equity and welfarism accommodating political commit

In each of the three contexts vote-trading can have both beneficial and harmful effects.

Contrary to this view, however, I argue in this article that the case for introducing policy measures against vote-trading in international institutions cannot be made on the basis of available evidence.

Vote-trading in international institutions often involves deals between wealthy countries and poor countries.

Poor countries have a greater incentive to sell their votes because payments are usually worth more to a poor country than to a wealthy country.1 Furthermore, current voting rules based on the equality of sovereigns provide extensive voting powers to many small countries on matters that they care little about.2 Therefore, small countries have a strong incentive to sell their votes.

I have chosen these institutions because there is solid evidence of vote-trading in each of these institutions and because they engage in a wide array of international activities. The second defines the two main types of decisions that international institutions are responsible for: preference-decisions and judgement-decisions.